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bstract
This paper provides an empirical analysis of the business regulatory factors that influence investment in a selection of 29 emerging market
conomies. Both theoretical and empirical literature on the effect of the regulatory environment on investment is reviewed. A panel data analysis
ver the period 2003–2007 reveals that investment is influenced by secure property rights and the degree of business entry regulation. The results
arry important policy implications for improving the investment climate of emerging market economies.
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. Introduction
The World Bank (2004), World Development Report 2005,
sserts that a good investment climate, which addresses the local
nstitutional, regulatory and policy environment in which firms
perate, stimulates economic growth by providing firms with the
ncentive to invest and improve productivity. Although economic
heory suggests that there are numerous factors that foster long
erm economic growth, more recent studies affirm that encourag-
ng private sector led growth has much broader ramifications on
he economy as a whole. In particular, encouraging entrepreneur-
hip and the development of firms is vital in addressing poverty
nd underdevelopment in developing economies.
The concept of a good investment climate is closely associ-
ted with the seminal work by Hernando de Soto (1990, 2000)
n property rights and ownership. He argues that the economic
uccess of a country like Japan can be attributed to a large extent
o a clear system of property rights that was created after the∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: bkorutaro@gmail.com (B. Korutaro),
icholas.biekpe@gsb.uct.ac.za (N. Biekpe).
eer review under responsibility of Africagrowth Institute.
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Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.econd World War. He provides evidence to suggest that people
n developing countries lack an integrated formal property
ystem, which results in informal ownership of land and goods.
s a result the poor, in today’s developing economies, find it
ifficult to leverage their current informal ownerships into capi-
al as collateral for credit – a vital aspect of free enterprise. This
rgument is supported by other studies by Knack and Keefer
1995) and Rodrik (2000), who affirm that institutions and
roperty rights not only influence the magnitude of investment,
ut also the efficiency with which inputs are allocated.
The World Bank has conducted numerous studies over the
ast decades aimed at developing better indicators for measuring
nstitutional quality or performance and its effect on economic
utcomes. More recently, the ‘Doing Business’ project was
stablished, after numerous studies were undertaken, to monitor
nd benchmark the business regulatory environment of countries
round the world. This project is a time-in-motion study that
ollects data on regulations that enhance and constrain busi-
ess activity. A number of multilateral organisations now use
hese performance indicators as targets that developing countries
ust aspire to achieve in order to obtain donor aid and grants.
owever, there has been criticism about the validity of these indi-
ators. There are those who contend that these indicators distort
he role of the institutional environment by creating simplistic
uantitative measures of regulations that are complex, integrated
ystems (Berg and Cazes, 2007; Davis and Kruse, 2007). Fur-
hermore, there are those who assert that the methodology used
n obtaining these indicators prejudices essential trade-offs in
nstitutional design. For instance, the exclusive focus on the pri-
ate costs paid by entrepreneurs obscures the cost to the state of
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regulation from the Economic Freedom of the World Index
(EFW),2 was able to highlight significant findings that suggest
that countries with less overall regulation have higher rates of
1 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
2 Economic Freedom of the World Index includes regulation as one of its five2 B. Korutaro, N. Biekpe / Review o
roviding better business or property registration services; yet
eveloping economies require functional registries with reliable
nformation that can be used in litigation (Arrunada, 2008).
The purpose of this cross-sectional study is to investigate
mpirically whether business regulations influences investment.
ata from 2003 to 2007 on a selection of 29 emerging mar-
et economies from Africa, Latin America, Asia and Europe
btained from the ‘Doing Business’ database were used.
hese economies have been selected because emerging mar-
et economies are considered to be economies in transition that
ace similar constraints in encouraging domestic investment and
ttracting foreign capital flows. It is anticipated that the empirical
nalysis from this study will contribute to deeper understanding
f the business regulatory factors that influence investment in
hese economies. Furthermore, this study will contribute to the
n-going debate on regulation and its influence on economic
erformance outcomes.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows: Section 2 pro-
ides a review of the literature on investment, institutions and
egulation. Section 3 provides a discussion on the theoretical
spects of the institutional factors identified as explanatory vari-
bles in this study. Section 4 describes the empirical strategy for
he analysis of this study while Section 5.1 provides a descrip-
ion of the data. Section 5.2 presents and discusses the results of
he empirical analysis and Section 6 summarises the findings of
he research and provides final remarks.
. Literature review
Institutions have been referred to in the literature as the ‘rules
f the game’ in relation to economic performance. It is suggested
hat without them economies would not exist in the functional
tate in which we know them today. Institutions according to
orth (1991) are “humanly devised constraints that structure
olitical, economic and social interaction. They consist of both
nformal constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions and
odes of conduct), and formal rules (constitutions, laws, property
ights)”.
Their role in a society is to reduce uncertainty by estab-
ishing a stable (but not necessarily efficient) structure to
uman interaction. According to North (1991), institutions affect
he performance of the economy by their effect on the cost
f exchange and production. Together with the technology
mployed, they determine the transactions and transformation
production) costs that make up total costs. Therefore, they deter-
ine the profitability and feasibility of engaging in economic
ctivity. It is important to emphasise that institutions would not
xist if human interaction consisted of only harmonious rela-
ions.
Even though institutions play a significant role in social inter-
ction, understanding their effect on economic outcomes has
volved slowly over the past century. According to economic
istory, the initial neoclassical view assumed that exchange in
he market arose spontaneously from the close interaction of
elf-seeking individuals. The goods that were traded in every
arket were assumed to be homogenous so that prices provided
he only information needed to make decisions on production
m
(
o
Flopment Finance 3 (2013) 41–50
nd purchasing (North, 1990; Williamson, 2000). Therefore, no
ndividual had sufficient power to influence the market price
ince exchange was driven simply by utility considerations. In
ther words, they argued that competition arising out of the pri-
ing system coordinated the transactions of the market and there
ere no cost implications.
It was Ronald Coase (1937) who questioned the notion of
ostless transactions. He argued that there were costs that arose
ut of negotiations during business transactions such as draw-
ng up contracts and carrying out inspections. It was these costs
hat determined whether a transaction would take place or not.
s he succinctly said, ‘Business men in deciding on their ways
f doing business and on what to produce take into account
ransaction costs. If the costs of making an exchange are greater
han the gains which that exchange would bring, that exchange
ould not take place and the greater production that would flow
rom specialisation would not be realized’ (Coase, 1992:716).
urthermore, Coase (1960) argued that what were traded in the
arket were not, physical entities, but the rights to perform cer-
ain actions, and the rights which individuals possessed were
stablished by the legal system. In essence if property rights
nd, contract enforcement – that are all influenced by the legal
ystem – are vital aspects of the economic system of a soci-
ty, then it makes little sense for economists to discuss the
rocess of exchange without specifying the institutional set-
ing within which the trading takes place since this influences
he incentives to produce and the costs of transacting. Numer-
us contributions to the literature on the role of institutions and
ransaction costs and their effect on investment and economic
rowth (North, 1981, 1991; Knack and Keefer, 1995; Hall and
ones, 1999; Acemoglu et al., 2001; Rodrik, 2000) have been
ade since 1960. They all, to a large extent, suggest that insti-
utions contribute to understanding cross-country differences in
conomic performance. However, the channel through which
hey influence economic performance is still largely disputed.
Excessive regulation is considered to be an outcome of ineffi-
ient institutions. More recent studies have focused on different
spects of regulation in product markets and their effect on
nvestment and long-term economic growth. In an empirical
tudy to investigate the effect of regulatory reform on invest-
ent in several sectors of 21 OECD1 countries, Alesina et al.
2005) show that regulation is a significant determinant of invest-
ent. They provide sufficient evidence to show that product
arket regulation can influence the costs that existing firms face
hen expanding their productive capacity. Their overall assess-
ent shows that regulatory reforms that substantially lower entry
arriers encourage investment. Dawson (2006), using data onajor areas. Others areas are: (1) legal structure and security of property rights,
2) freedom to trade internationally, (3) access to sound money, and (4) size
f government expenditures, taxes and enterprises (Fraser Institute’s Economic
reedom of the World Annual Report).
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Weak property rights are considered a deterrent to invest-
ment since the perceived risk of losing ownership rights or
returns on investment is increased. Evidence from the empirical
4 Basic rights include, maternity leave or minimum wage.
5 Employment laws govern the individual employment contract, for instance
restricting the range of feasible contracts, raising laying off costs or increasingB. Korutaro, N. Biekpe / Review o
rivate investment. By looking at different types of regulation
credit market, labour market and business), the study found
hat the index of business regulation3 was statistically signifi-
ant and positively related to growth. This suggests that countries
ith less business regulation tend to experience higher long-term
rowth rates as a result of higher factor productivity.
. Theoretical considerations
Ronald Coase, Douglass North, Oliver Williamson and the
ther Coasean proponents assert that the formal institutional
nvironment – the laws, government and judiciary – affect
conomic performance by determining (together with the tech-
ology employed) transaction and production costs. Therefore,
iven that the main objective of firms is to maximise profits,
t is implicitly implied that a favourable institutional environ-
ent ensures investors in the market are awarded returns on
heir investments in the form of income or dividends. Further-
ore, they argue that the enforcement of property rights and
ontract law is an important feature of an efficient and effective
nstitutional framework. This section discusses the theoretical
onsiderations relating to the effect of the regulatory variables
sed in this study.
There are a number of theoretical arguments on regulation and
ts effect on economic outcomes. These are firstly, Pigou’s public
nterest theory of regulation. Pigou (1938) assumes that unhin-
ered markets often fail because of problems of monopolies
r externalities. Furthermore Pigou assumes that governments
re benevolent and capable of correcting these failures through
egulation. In other words, regulation seeks the protection and
enefit of the public at large. Secondly, the public choice theory,
n general, views government as less benevolent and regulation
s socially inefficient. According to Stigler’s (1971:3) theory of
egulatory capture, ‘regulation is acquired by the industry and is
esigned and operated primarily for its benefit.’ In other words,
overnments’ regulatory agencies created to act in the public
nterest, instead, protect the commercial or special interests of
hose they are charged with regulating. The theory of regulatory
apture is a core aspect of the public choice premise.
Djankov et al. (2002), in a study to investigate the regulation
f entry of start-up firms in 85 countries found little evidence
o show that stricter regulation of entry provides better social
utcomes, like higher quality products or improved competi-
iveness. On the other hand, they found that stricter regulation of
ntry is associated with significantly higher levels of corruption
nd a larger unofficial economy. Their findings support the pub-
ic choice theory that emphasises rent extraction by government
ureaucrats.
The research on the regulation of labour markets has been
tudied extensively. So, why do governments regulate their
abour markets? The fundamental argument for most interven-
ions is that free labour markets are imperfect and as a result there
3 Business Regulation in EFW Index consists of: price controls, administrative
onditions and new businesses, time with government bureaucracy, starting a
usiness and irregular payments.
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re rents in the employment relationship. Employers exploit
orkers to extract these rents leading to both unfairness and inef-
ciency. As a result governments use different forms of labour
egulations to protect workers from employers. According to
otero et al. (2004), these include – in addition to basic civil
ights protections4 – employment law,5 collective relations law6
nd social security law.7 Their study investigates the regulation
f labour markets through employment, collective relations and
ocial security laws in 85 countries. Botero et al. (2004) found
hat heavier regulation of labour has adverse consequences for
abour-force participation and employment prospects especially
or the young. There is also evidence to show that flexible labour
arkets are of great importance in reducing unemployment and
mproving the competitiveness of the economy. According to
i Tella and MacCulloch (2005), in their study of 21 OECD
ountries for the period 1984–1990, increasing the flexibility of
he labour market increases both the employment rate and the
abour force participation rate. Javorcik and Spatareanu (2005),
n a study to investigate the effect of labour market regulation
n foreign direct investment (FDI) across 19 western and east-
rn European countries, found that greater flexibility in the host
ountry’s labour market is associated with a higher probability
nd volume of investment. On the other hand, there are those who
rgue that flexible labour markets increase income inequalities
nd widen the skills gap, which negatively influences long-run
nvestment and economic growth (Pissarides, 2001). The chan-
el through which employment regulation affects investment is
mbiguous.
It is well established that better investor protection encour-
ges the development of financial markets and it is through
his channel that it influences the real economy. It is argued
hat greater protection of shareholders and creditors fosters bet-
er functioning stock and debt markets and facilitates the flow
f capital to firms. Furthermore according to La Portia et al.
1997), there is evidence to show that when investor rights,
uch as the voting rights of shareholders and the reorganisa-
ion and liquidation rights of creditors, are extensive and well
nforced by regulators or courts, investors are willing to provide
nance. There is also evidence to show that the financial system
s a vital channel through which investment capital and savings
re transformed into real investment thereby enhancing capital
ccumulation (Beck and Levine, 2003; Ndikumana, 2000).
8orking hours.
6 Collective or industrial relation laws regulate the bargaining, adoption and
nforcement of collective agreements, the organisation of trade unions and
ndustrial action by workers and employers.
7 Social security laws govern the social response to needs and conditions that
ave a significant impact on the quality of life, such as old age, disability, death,
ickness and employment.
8 It is the right conferred on the owner (individual or firm) of a property to
onsume, sell, rent, mortgage, transfer and exchange the property.
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This section describes the data used in the study. The anal-
ysis covers a selection of 299 emerging market economies
over a five-year sample period, 2003–2007. Emerging market4 B. Korutaro, N. Biekpe / Review o
iterature in cross-country studies shows that less secure property
ights are correlated with less aggregate investment and slower
conomic growth (Mauro, 1995; Acemoglu et al. (2001)). The
rgument put forward is that secure property rights are essen-
ial in order to induce investment by entrepreneurs. According
o Patillo (2001), in an analysis of the investment behaviour of
hanaian firms, weak property rights limit the reinvestment of
rofits in some types of firms and those firms with the least secure
roperty rights invest nearly 40 per cent less than those with
ore secure property rights. This evidence is corroborated in a
tudy on property rights and investment in five post-communist
ountries. The results show that those entrepreneurs who per-
eive their property rights to be the least secure reinvest 32 per
ent of their profits, while those who perceive their property
ights to be secure reinvest 56 per cent (Johnson et al., 2002).
iven that there is ample evidence to show that secure prop-
rty rights are important for investment, it is usually assumed
hat these rights will be enforced. However, according to North
1991) this assumption is flawed for a number of reasons. The
rst is that there are problems that arise from information asym-
etries such as moral hazard or adverse selection and the second
s that enforcement relies on agents whose own utility functions
nfluence outcomes. Therefore, in order to provide the incentive
o transact, regulators and courts that ensure that agents abide
y the laws are essential. In addition, according to Botero et al.
2003) on judicial reforms across countries around the world,
implifying judicial procedures and increasing the flexibility of
ourts can enhance judicial efficiency.
. Methodology
.1. Empirical strategy
The discussion above illustrates how both regulatory and
acro-economic factors may influence aggregate investment in
he selected emerging market economies. Ignoring nonlineari-
ies, the economic relationship being identified is:
it = α + βvit + γφit + εit (1)
here Iit is the gross capital stock of country i in year t, mea-
ured as gross capital stock as a percentage of gross domestic
roduct (GDP). vit consists of a selection of business regulation
ariables, φit is a selection of control variables and εit is the
omposite error term. The coefficients of interest are β and γ .
The primary challenge of this study is the data. The history
f the data is limited to five years and there are missing data
oints. In order to estimate the effect of business regulation on
nvestment, a panel-data framework approach is used. According
o Baltagi (2005), this approach has a number of advantages
nd these include: panel data analysis combines both time-series
nd cross-sectional data to increase the number of observations;
nd the modelling options and appropriate tests enable one to
xamine the relevance of fixed, random and systematic time and
ountry effects. The basic framework for the analysis is in the
orm of the following regression equation:
it = βx′it + αZ′i + εit (2)
G
g
Plopment Finance 3 (2013) 41–50
here (i = 1, . . . , N) is the number of countries and (t =
, . . . , T ) is the number of time periods. x′it consists of K regres-
ors but excludes a constant term. According to Greene (2003),
he individual effect is αZ′it where Zi contains a constant term
nd a set of individual or group-specific variables that may be
bserved or unobserved and that are taken to be constant over
ime, t. If Zi is observed for all individuals and contains only
constant term, the entire model can be treated as an ordinary
inear model and fit by least squares.
However, if Zi is unobserved but correlated with xit , the
east-squares estimator of β is biased and inconsistent due to
n omitted variable. The model is then referred to as a fixed
ffects model and is specified as follows;
it = βx′it + αi + εit (3)
here αi = αz′i and embodies all the observable effects. The
xed effects approach takes αi to be a group-specific constant
erm in the regression model that does not vary over time. On the
ther hand if zi is unobserved but uncorrelated with the regres-
ors, then the model is referred to as a random effects model and
s formulated as follow;
it = βx′it + E
[
αz′i
] + {αz′i − E
[
αz′i
]} + εit (4)
βx′it + (α + μi) + εit (5)
in which μi is the random heterogeneity specific to the ith
bservation and is constant through time.
In order to determine whether the individual effects are cor-
elated with the regressors, the Hausman (1978) specification
est may be used. It is used to test for orthogonality of the ran-
om effects and the regressors. Under the null hypothesis of
rthogonality (no correlation between the individual effects and
xplanatory variables), both random and fixed effects estima-
ors are consistent but the random effect estimator is efficient
hile the fixed effects estimator is not. Under the alternative
ypothesis that the individual effects are correlated with the
egressors, the random effects estimator is inconsistent while the
xed effects estimator is consistent and efficient. The difference
etween the two estimators is the Hausman test statistic defined
imply as
= [bGLS − bW ]′[V (bW − V (bGLS)]−1[bGLS − bW ], (6)
The Hausman test statistic will be distributed asymptotically
s χ2 with k degrees of freedom under the null hypothesis that
he random estimator is correct.
.2. Data and variable deﬁnition9 Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru Algeria, Botswana, Egypt,
hana, Kenya, Mauritius, Morocco, South Africa, Tunisia, Nigeria, Bul-
aria, Poland, Romania, Russia, Turkey, China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia,
hilippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand and South Korea.
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conomies were selected because firstly, according to the World
ank Global Economic Prospects (World Bank, 2007) over the
ast five years, these economies have accounted for between
ne-quarter and one-half of global growth and this has been
ttributed to, among other factors, a better investment environ-
ent in these countries. Secondly, these countries had data on
ll the explanatory variables.
The ‘Doing Business’ project collects data on regulations
hat enhance and those that constrain business activity. Data on
usiness regulations is obtained in 10 areas of business activ-
ty across 181 economies. These are starting a business, dealing
ith licences, employing workers, registering property, getting
redit, protecting investors, paying taxes, trading across bor-
ers, enforcing contracts and closing a business. The data are
ollected in a standardised way using a simple business case
o ensure comparability across countries and over time with
ssumptions about the legal form of the business, its size, loca-
ion, and nature of its operations. The data are obtained from
ocal experts, government officials and other professionals who
outinely administer or provide advice on legal and regulatory
equirements. The fundamental premise of the ‘Doing Business’
roject is that economic activity requires good rules. Therefore,
f these rules are to benefit all types of firms then they must
e designed to be efficient, accessible to all who need to use
hem and simple in their implementation. All the business reg-
lation variables are obtained from the ‘Doing Business’ online
atabase (World Bank, 2007a).
Investment. In order to measure investment, gross capital
tock measured as a percentage of GDP is used. One would
xpect that a favourable regulatory environment would result in
n increase in investment that would be reflected as an accu-
ulation of capital stock. Gross capital stock is used instead of
rivate investment because of data availability on the selected
ountries.
Business entry regulation. The direct effect of business for-
alisation on investment is captured by one variable in this
tudy – the number of procedures to start a business. This vari-
ble measures the pre- and post-incorporation procedures that
re officially required by an entrepreneur to formally operate a
usiness and it is measured in absolute values terms. The more
rocedures there are required to start a business the more dif-
cult it is to operate in the formal economy. Previous studies
how that the number of procedures is highly correlated with
ime and cost, which implies that it costs entrepreneurs more in
erms of fees and delays to start a formal business where there are
engthy procedures (Djankov et al., 2002). The coefficient of this
ariable is expected to be negatively associated with investment
rowth.
Employment regulation. In the ‘Doing Business’ project, the
exibility of employment regulation is measured by the rigidity
f the employment index. It is the simple average of three sub-
ndices – difficulty of hiring index, rigidity of working hours
ndex and difficulty of firing index. All sub-indicators take on
alues between 0 and 100, with higher values indicating more
igid regulation.
The expected effect of property rights on investment is cap-
ured by three variables in this study – property registration,
1
l
l
tlopment Finance 3 (2013) 41–50 45
ontract enforcement and licensing regulation. Property reg-
stration is measured in terms of the number of procedures
equired to register a property (land or a building). The num-
er of procedures is recorded in absolute figures and records all
rocedures that are legally or, in practice, required to transfer
roperty title from a seller to a buyer. The coefficient of this
ariable is expected to be negatively associated with investment
ince more procedures imply that securing property rights is
umbersome. Contract enforcement, which is an indicator of
he efficiency of the judicial system in a country, is measured in
erms of the number of procedures required to enforce a commer-
ial dispute. In this study, the number of procedures is considered
o be a sufficient indicator and, therefore, the cost and time
equired to execute these procedures is excluded. In addition,
here is evidence to show that higher procedural formalism is a
trong predictor of longer duration of dispute resolution, lower
nforceability of contracts, higher corruption, as well as reduced
onesty, consistency and fairness of the system (Djankov et al.,
003). The number of procedures is recorded in absolute values
nd includes the steps required to file the case until judgement is
nforced. Fewer procedures to enforce a contract imply that the
ourts are efficient and, therefore, it is simple to enforce a con-
ract while more procedures would imply the contrary. Licensing
egulation. The ease or difficulty of securing all the required
icences by a contractor is an indicator of the burden of secur-
ng property rights. There is also theoretical evidence to suggest
hat licensing regulations, including other factors, have nega-
ively influenced private investment in the electricity sector of
anzania (Marandu, 2004). Licensing registration measures the
umber of procedures required for a business in the construc-
ion industry to build a standardised warehouse. The procedures
re measured in absolute values and more procedures imply that
icensing regulation is rigid and cumbersome. The coefficient
f this variable is expected to be negatively associated with
nvestment.
The effect of investor protection on investment is captured by
wo variables in this study – protection of minority shareholders’
ights and lender and borrowers’ rights. In this study, share-
olders’ rights are measured by the investor protection index.
his index measures the strength of minority shareholder rights
gainst directors’ misuse of corporate assets. According to the
Doing Business’ project, three aspects of investor protection are
easured: transparency of transactions, liability for self-dealing
nd shareholders’ ability to sue officers and directors for miscon-
uct. The investor protection index value is the simple average
f these three sub-components and its values range from 0 to
0, with higher values indicating better investor protection. The
oefficient of this variable is expected to be positively associated
ith investment. Borrowers’ and lenders’ rights are considered
o be important in facilitating access to credit for investment
rom financial institutions. The borrowers and lenders measure
he degree to which collateral and bankruptcy laws protect the
ights of borrowers and lenders. The index values range from 0 to
0, with higher scores indicating that collateral and bankruptcy
aws provide better protection of the rights of borrowers and
enders. The coefficient of this variable is expected to be posi-
ively associated with investment.
4 f Development Finance 3 (2013) 41–50
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Table 1
Summary statistics – full sample.
Variable Mean Std. dev. Minimum Maximum
Business entry regulation 10.40 2.91 5 19
Licensing regulation 21.56 8.67 10 56
Employment regulation 34.41 13.68 7 66
Property registration 6.94 3.15 2 19
Lender and borrower rights 5.23 2.34 3 10
Investor protection 5.55 1.22 3 8.7
Contract enforcement 37.84 4.49 29 47
Income 249.87 388.52 5 2364.44
Savings 24.88 11.69 3 54
Inflation 7.70 5.33 0 29
Labour force participation rate 65.93 8.24 49 84
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A set of control variables that are considered to be significant
eterminants of investment are also included in the analysis.
hese variables include total labour force participation rate (a
roxy of human capital development), income measured as the
og of GDP (a measure of the size of the economy), inflation
easured by changes in the consumer price index (a measure
f macro-economic stability) and savings that are measured as
ross domestic savings as a percentage of GDP. Data on these
ariables are obtained from the World Development Indicators
D-ROM (2007). A number of dummy variables are included
n order to capture the unobservable factors such as cultural
nd historical differences that may influence investment. These
nclude the Latin America dummy, Africa dummy, Asia dummy
nd emerging Europe dummy.
It is argued that institutions are endogenous and therefore
eflect various historical and cultural influences (North, 1990;
odrik, 2000). In addition, it has been affirmed that countries
ith rising or high incomes are more likely to have better regu-
atory environments. Therefore, in order to estimate the effect of
nstitutions on economic outcomes, a source of exogenous vari-
tion is required. In the literature, instrumental variables have
een used as a source of exogenous variation in institutions. As
n instrumental variable for institutional quality, Acemoglu et al.
2001) used mortality rates of colonial settlers in colonised areas
hile Hall and Jones (1999) used the fraction of the population
hat spoke English and western European languages. The legal
rigin has been used by La Porta et al. (1997) as an instrument
or regulation. According to Botero et al. (2004), a country’s
pproach to regulation is shaped by its legal tradition. La Porta
t al. (1997) provides evidence to show that the laws of the dif-
erent colonisers and occupiers significantly influenced the legal
ystems of the conquered countries. They found that common
nd civil law traditions utilise different strategies for dealing with
arket failure. The common law traditions that emerged from
ngland rely on contract and private litigation. Whereas civil law
raditions that evolved from Roman law and were incorporated
nto civil codes in France and Germany rely on direct super-
ision of markets by the governments. Socialist law traditions
hat were adopted in countries that came under the influence of
he former Soviet Union also rely on government regulation and
tate ownership.
In this study the legal origin is used as the instrumental vari-
ble. English legal origin dummy: English legal origin equals
if the country has English common law traditions and 0 if the
ountry has French civil law or socialist law traditions as defined
y the origin of each country’s commercial/company law (La
orta et al., 1999). French legal origin dummy: French legal
rigin equals 1 if the country has a French civil law tradition
nd 0 if the country has English common law or socialist law
raditions. There is evidence to show that countries with French
nd socialist legal origins tend to have lower levels of property
ights protection than countries with English legal origins
Botero et al., 2004; Djankov et al., 2002). Therefore, it would
e expected that countries with English legal origins attract
ore investment than those with French or socialist legal ori-
ins. Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics for the full sample
nd Tables 3 and 4 (in Appendix) show the summary statistics
5
aross capital formation 24.41 6.56 14 46
or Latin America and Africa, emerging Europe and Asia
espectively.
. Empirical results
.1. Descriptive statistics
The average number of procedures required to formalise a
usiness for the full sample of countries is 10 (see Table 1) while
he emerging European countries (Appendix) have the lowest
umber of procedures. Therefore, in this sample, it is easiest to
tart a business in the emerging European countries (eight proce-
ures) and it takes longest (12 procedures) in the Latin American
ountries (see Appendix). It is most difficult to secure a build-
ng licence in emerging European economies (30 procedures),
hile it is easiest in Latin America. There is no significant vari-
tion in investor protection among the four regions. However, it
s important to note that Morocco and Tunisia perform the worst
n this index; while Malaysia, Mauritius and South Africa offer
nvestors the highest protection. Lender and borrower rights are
est protected in emerging European economies and are least
rotected in Latin American economies. The largest variation
mong the regulatory variables is in employment regulation with
minimum of seven and a maximum of 66 for the full sample.
he emerging European economies in this sample have the most
exible employment regulations while Asian economies have
he least flexible employment regulations. It takes an average of
7 procedures to enforce a contract in the full sample of countries
ith no significant difference in the various regions. Botswana
as the least number of procedures required to enforce a con-
ract with an average number of 29 while Algeria has the most
47) number of procedures. Property registration takes longest in
frica, with Nigeria recording the maximum value of 19 proce-
ures (maximum in the full sample), whilst it is easiest in Asia,
ith Thailand recording two procedures (minimum in the full
ample).
.2. Discussion of regression resultsThe empirical results presented in Table 2 show the effect of
selection of business regulation variables on investment for an
B. Korutaro, N. Biekpe / Review of Development Finance 3 (2013) 41–50 47
Table 2
Regression results (random effects GLS regression).
Dependent variable
Gross capital formation as a percentage of GDP
Independent variables (1) (2) (3)
Business entry regulation −0.05624** −0.02745 −0.03860**
(−2.06) (−1.01) (−1.48)
Employment regulation −0.00327 −0.00459 −0.00619
(−0.54) (−0.73) (−1.01)
Property rights
Licensing regulation −0.02078** −0.03744** −0.03272***
(−2.21) (−3.26) (−3.28)
Property registration −0.04437* −0.04692* −0.05710**
(−1.83) (−2.01) (−2.50)
Contract enforcement 0.02505 0.01782 0.01637
(1.21) (0.92) (0.87)
Investor protection
Borrower and lenders’ rights 0.02211 −0.03452 −0.02767
(0.66) (−0.92) (−0.79)
Minority shareholders’ rights −0.09493 −0.06075 −0.10561
(−1.53) (−1.02) (−1.83)
Income 0.00587** 0.00684*** 0.00506**
(2.56) (3.06) (2.48)
Savings 0.00296*** 0.00314*** 0.00258***
(4.55) (4.84) (4.33)
Inflation 0.00017 0.00038 0.00052
(0.17) (0.41) (0.54)
Labour force participation rate 0.00073 0.00128 0.00085
(0.71) (1.32) (0.09)
Latin America (dummy) −0.09716**
(−2.94)
Africa (dummy) −0.02583
(−0.98)
Asia (dummy) −0.04478
(−1.37)
French legal origin −0.03912**
(−2.01)
Socialist legal origin 0.03407
(1.35)
Constant 0.19580* 0.24333** 0.35102***
(2.18) (3.05)
R-squared 46.01 57.15 60.85
Wald χ2 (11)42.68 (14)48.99 (13)39.37
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0001]
Observations 87 87 87
Hausman test Wald χ2(11) = 6.55 Wald χ2(14) = 5.79 Wald χ2(13) = 8.64
[0.8342] [0.9714] [0.7998]
Notes: T-statistics are in parentheses and probability values in square brackets.
* Significance at 10%.
*
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e** Significance at 5%.
** Significance at 1%.
nbalanced panel of 29 countries over the period 2003–2007.
andom effects regression estimates are generated for all the
pecifications of the model specified in Eq. (1). Column (1)
egression estimates show the effect of the selected explanatory
ariables on investment measured as gross capital formation as
percentage of GDP. In Column (2), three regional dummies
re included to establish whether there are significant variations
n the four regions selected. Lastly, column (3) shows results
n which the instrumental variable – legal origin – is included.
olumn (1) results show that the number of procedures to start
business has a negative and significant effect on investment.
d
o
lhis result implies that excessive business entry regulation is
significant barrier to investment in a country. This result is
onsistent with findings by Djankov et al. (2002), which show
hat more barriers, in the form of administrative hurdles to
egistering a business, hampers the number of firms that can
perate in the formal economy.
Employment regulation was found to have an insignificant
ffect on investment in the study. Although this result contra-
icts a priori expectations, it is consistent with the suggestion
f Bertola and Rogerson (1997) that the effect of flexible
abour regulation may only be felt when other labour market
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nstitutions, that seek to create an equilibrium in the labour
arket, like those that affect employment (severance pay,
dvance notice laws) and wages (minimum wages), are well
stablished and enforced. They argue that if these regulations do
ot exist or are not harmonised then flexible labour regulation
ay have an adverse or no effect on employment levels in
he economy. Furthermore, the result obtained may arise from
election bias. The assumptions made in measuring the employ-
ent regulation variable are not representative of the working
opulation, especially in developing or emerging economies.
ccording to the ‘Doing Business’ project, it is assumed that the
orker (unit of measurement of this variable) is a nonexecutive,
ull-time employee who has worked in the same company for
0 years. However, there is evidence to show that, for instance,
n the European Union in 2005 only 17 per cent of the working
opulation had job tenure of 20 or more years. The average
enure was 10.6 years. In central and eastern Europe, the average
enure was 9 years and Poland had the longest average tenure
f 11.7 years in 2003. In Latin America average tenure was
pproximately 6.2 years (Berg and Cazes, 2007). Lastly, high
osts associated with labour regulations increase the cost of
roduction and have been blamed for the growth of the informal
ector in many economies. In addition, it is well established that
significant proportion of the population in most developing
conomies is unemployed or is employed in the informal econ-
my. Employment in the informal economy does not adhere to
ormal employment contracts and labour regulations although,
rguably, there may be informal rules that govern employment
elationships. Therefore, it is plausible that the effect of rigid
r flexible labour regulations as measured by this variable will
ot have an effect on investment in these economies.
Two of the property rights variables were found to have a sig-
ificant effect on investment: in particular, more rigid licensing
egulation has a significant and negative effect on investment.
his result implies that the longer it takes to secure the required
icences and permits, the longer it takes to obtain full ownership
nd control of the property. Therefore, it will also take longer
o use the property as collateral or to transfer ownership. This
esult is consistent with the literature that shows that easy
nd simple licensing procedures that enhance efficiency and
ransparency also enhance private investment (Marandu, 2004).
urthermore, the results also show that a one standard deviation
eduction in the number of procedures required for registering
property, increases investment by approximately 1.4 per cent.
his result confirms that formal ownership of property is less
umbersome when there are few administrative procedures
equired to register property. This result is consistent with
priori expectation and with evidence that shows that land
eforms in Thailand that encouraged property titling increased
ccess to credit for people with formal titles and increased land
alues and investment (Burns, 2005). The estimated coefficient
or contract enforcement is insignificant. Intuitively, it would be
xpected that an efficient judicial system structured to resolve
ommercial disputes and enforce contracts would reduce the
ost of doing business (it will, for instance, reduce litigation
osts) and therefore enhance investment. However, according to
otero et al. (2003), the result obtained is plausible, especially
r
w
i
clopment Finance 3 (2013) 41–50
n developing economies where the judiciary is underfunded
nd therefore lacks the administrative capacity and personnel
uch as judges to operate efficiently. As a result, the judicial
rocess is slow and is riddled with corrupt officials. They
rovide evidence to show that firms use alternative channels to
esolve disputes like arbitration and informal or native courts (in
atin America they are known as mediation centres; and as; Lok
dalats in India). These alternative channels are more efficient
nd officials are less able to extract bribes from litigants.
Neither investor protection variable has a significant effect on
ggregate investment. It is surprising that shareholder rights are
ot significant determinants of investment. This is inconsistent
ith the literature given that there is ample evidence to sug-
est that greater protection of shareholders’ rights, by means of
aws that regulate self-dealing, encourages investment in finan-
ial markets (La Porta et al., 1997). However, this result possibly
rises for a number of reasons. Firstly, there were a number
f assumptions taken into consideration when measuring this
ariable. It was assumed that the company was a food manufac-
urer that was domestically owned and listed on the country’s
ost important stock exchange. Given that in most emerging
conomies the percentage of domestically owned companies
hat are listed on the stock exchange, in comparison to all for-
ally owned domestic companies, is small, this result may be
reasonable representation. Secondly, the dependent variable
easures total investment. Possibly investigating the effect of
his variable on private investment may yield different results.
he coefficients for income and domestic savings are significant
nd with the predicted signs. This result is consistent with the
heory that high-income countries and high domestic savings are
ignificant determinants of investment.
Three regional dummies are included in Column (2) of
able 2. These dummies are included because firstly, there are a
umber of unobserved factors not captured in this study. These
nclude cultural or historical factors that may influence regula-
ion differently in each of these regions. Secondly, it is asserted in
umerous studies that Africa behaves differently from the other
egions because of its unique demographic and socio-political
nvironment. Only the Latin America dummy is significant at
he conventional levels, showing that this region has significantly
ess investment than emerging Europe. This result possibly arises
rom other factors not captured in this study like the political
nvironment, crime and corruption that are synonymous with
his region. Asia and Africa are both insignificant implying that
hey are not significantly different from emerging Europe. The
agnitudes of the coefficients of both property rights variables
emain considerable when the regional dummies are included.
owever, the magnitude for the coefficient of business entry
egulation reduces considerably and is insignificant.
The results obtained in Column (3) of Table 2, after
ontrolling for endogeneity, confirm the results obtained in
olumns (1) and (2). Business entry regulation is a significant
eterminant of investment. Licensing regulation and property
egistration are both significant at the conventional levels and
ith the predicted signs. A one-standard deviation reduction
n licensing procedures will increase investment by 2.8 per
ent. In addition a one standard deviation reduction in property
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egistration procedures will increase investment by 1.8 per cent.
n this sample of countries, licensing regulation imposes the
ost administrative barriers on investment. Income and domes-
ic savings are significant and with the predicted signs. The
stimated coefficient for the legal origin was found to be negative
nd significant at a 5 per cent level implying that countries with
rench civil law traditions have almost up to 4 per cent lower
nvestment than those with English common law traditions.
hese results are consistent with findings from previous studies
Beck et al., 2003; Djankov et al., 2002). Countries that have
dopted English common law traditions have been found to have
igher investment, since property rights are better protected
han in countries that adopted French civil law traditions.
. Conclusion
The pervasiveness of government regulation in business
ctivity has raised many questions over the past decades. Does
urdensome regulation create barriers for the people it is meant
o protect? The purpose of this study was to investigate empir-
cally whether business regulations as measured by the ‘Doing
usiness’ indicators have an impact on investment. Using seven
elected indicators from the ‘Doing Business’ database, a panel
ata analysis was performed on data for 29 emerging economies
a
n
t
able 3
ummary statistics for Africa and Latin America.
ariable Africa – 10 countries
Mean Std. dev. Min
usiness entry regulation 10.1 2.533 6
icensing regulation 19.67 4.581 10
mployment regulation 33.5 16.21 7
roperty registration 7.68 4.135 4
orrower and lender rights 5.725 2.611 3
nvestor protection 5.33 1.58 3
ontract enforcement 38.5 5.40 29
ncome 520.77 512.37 50
avings 24.28 14.52 3
nflation 8.46 5.96 0
abour force participation rate 63.36 9.16 49
ross capital formation 25.1 6.29 16
able 4
ummary statistics for Europe and Asia.
ariable Emerging Europe – 5 countries
Mean Std. dev. Min
usiness entry regulation 8.52 2.48 5
icensing regulation 29.6 14.07 17
mployment regulation 42.96 12.08 29
roperty registration 6.9 1.16 6
orrower and lender rights 6.0 2.17 3
nvestor protection 5.62 0.42 5
ontract enforcement 36.76 2.69 32
ncome 1905.14 1436.75 143.91
avings 18.64 7.93 10
nflation 10.16 6.80 0
abour force participation rate 62.04 5.95 51
ross capital formation 22.48 3.96 18lopment Finance 3 (2013) 41–50 49
n Africa, Asia, Latin America and emerging Europe for the
eriod 2003–2007. The results suggest that investment in these
merging economies is influenced by security of property rights
nd the degree of business entry regulation. In particular, the
esults show that where there are fewer administrative pro-
edures required to formalise a business, there is a positive
nd significant effect on investment in that economy. In addi-
ion, fewer procedures to register property or to secure business
icences have a positive and significant effect on investment.
urthermore, the estimates generated show that flexibility of
mployment regulation is not a significant determinant of invest-
ent. This result confirms previous studies that show that the
ffect of flexible labour regulations on economic performance
ay only be felt when other labour market institutions are well
stablished and enforced. In addition, the two indicators of
nvestor protection – minority shareholders’ rights, and lender
nd borrower rights – were found to be insignificant determi-
ants of investment. The results obtained suggest that further
nalysis of the effect of the selected business regulatory indi-
ators, using private and public investment as proxy variables
or the investment climate, may provide more conclusive results
bout the validity of these indicators. It is also important to
ote that this study is limited in scope since it did not assess
he effect that other factors considered to be important, such as
Latin America – 6 countries
Max Mean Std. dev. Min Max
14 12.03 3.38 8 19
28 18.5 5.31 12 28
63 37.47 9.74 24 48
19 7.33 3.37 5 14
10 4.17 1.09 3 7
8 5.65 0.80 3.7 6.7
47 38.6 3.87 34 46
1769.14 3259.81 2780.73 583.47 8070.80
54 24.07 5.17 17 37
29 7.16 3.27 3 14
83 68.97 6.29 58 78
42 20.27 2.59 15 25
Asia – 8 countries
Max Mean Std. dev. Min Max
13 10.73 2.52 5 15
56 21.21 7.62 11 37
66 27.93 10.10 10 44
9 5.75 1.95 2 8
8 4.94 2.50 3 10
6 5.72 1.32 4 8.7
40 37.13 4.45 30 46
4061.77 4771.20 6115.71 177.09 23,644.36
34 30.13 11.28 10 54
24 5.6 3.82 0 15
73 69.3 7.56 59 84
35 27.88 8.12 14 46
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he macroeconomic environment, infrastructure and the political
nvironment, have on the investment in these countries.
ppendix A.
See Tables 3 and 4
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